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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper presents an experiment that 
bridges emotional and analogy-making re-
search. It suggests that relational correspon-
dences may depend on long-lasting emotional 
states (i.e. mood). In congruence with the re-
search demonstrating different information 
processing depending on positive and negative 
mood, the presented experiment shows that 
participants in positive mood made more at-
tribute correspondences, while participants in 
negative mood – more relational ones.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A growing body of research focuses on the 
influence of emotions on cognitive processing. 
To date, the influence of affective information 
was primary investigated by manipulation of 
mood.  
In general the finding support the idea that 
negative affective states foster bottom-up data 
driven processing, while positive affective 
states encourage effortless top-down process-
ing (for a detailed review, Schwarz, 2002). For 
example, sad and happy participants heard a 
restaurant story that contained both script con-
sistent and script inconsistent information 
(Bless, Clore, Schwarz, Golisano, Rabe and 
Wolk, 1996). Participants in happy mood rec-
ognized previously heard script inconsistent 
information but showed high rates of mis-
recognition of previously not presented script 
consistent information.  Neither of these ef-
fects appeared in the recognition of previously 
heard restaurant story under negative mood. 
These results were interpreted as supporting 
the hypothesis that happy participants rely 
more on schemas (i.e. scripts), while sad par-
ticipants rely more on detailed oriented bot-
tom-up and effortful processing of the incom-
ing information. These two opposite process-
ing styles were found to affect differently the 
performance on several types of cognitive 
tasks. 
Isen and Daubman (1984) showed that par-
ticipants in happy mood made more inclusive 
categorizations relative to a control. For exam-
ple, happy participants were more likely to 
include “camel” and “feet” to the category 
“vehicle” than controls. Happy participants 
were also found to sort colored chips in 
smaller number of piles and to list more un-
usual exemplars of given category than sad 
participants (Hirt, Levine, McDonald, Melton, 
and Martin , 1997). Isen (1987) suggested that 
people in happy mood may outperform people 
in sad mood because of this specific categori-
zation processes. Happy mood facilitates recall 
of diverse material and hence makes possible 
drawing of novel connections and insights. It 
was demonstrated, indeed, that participants in 
happy mood outperformed sad or neutral-
mood participants on Remote Associates Test 
(Isen, Daubman and Nowichki, 1987) and 
listed more unusual first associates of neutral 
words than sad or neutral-mood participants 
(Isen, Johnoson, Metz and Robinson, 1985). 
Moreover, happy mood was also reported to 
facilitate performance on Duncker’s candle 
task relative to a neutral or sad mood (Isen and 
Daubman, 1984). 
Several researches consistently showed that 
people in positive mood were equally per-
suaded by strong as well as weak arguments 
compared with non-manipulated or sad par-
ticipants (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz and Strack, 
1990; Bless, Mackie and Schwarz, 1992; People in Negative Mood May See Relations Where People in Positive Mood May Not 
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Bohner, Crow, Erb and Schwarz, 1992; 
Mackie and Worth, 1989, Worth and Mackie, 
1987). Since elaborative and systematic proc-
essing of message content was considered to 
give advantage of strong versus weak argu-
ments in persuasion, mood states were as-
sumed to influence the processing strategies. 
People in happy mood spontaneously rely on 
simplifying strategies (i.e. communicator’s 
status or expertise; see, Worth and Mackie, 
1987) and general knowledge in processing of 
incoming persuasion message. On the con-
trary, people in sad mood are more likely to 
engage in systematic and elaborative scrutiniz-
ing of a counterattitudinal message
1. Similarly, 
participants in happy mood are more likely to 
form impressions based on category member-
ship than participants in sad mood. Sad par-
ticipants rely more on the individuating infor-
mation rather than on stereotypes during im-
pression formation (Bless, Schwarz and Kam-
melmeier, 1996, for a review).  
These seemingly contradictory findings 
from creativity and social cognition domain 
were explained by the means of mood congru-
ent recall (Isen, 1987; Mackie and Worth, 
1989).  Positive mood facilitates recall of lar-
ger amount of information than negative 
mood, because positive memories were as-
sumed to be tightly interconnected than nega-
tive material stored in our memory. In this 
way, novel connections between disparate 
ideas became more probable under positive 
mood (Isen, 1987). This extensive recall, how-
ever, may hinder the use of effortful detail-
oriented processing under happy mood and in 
turn may underpin the use of effortless simpli-
fying heuristics (Mackie and Worth, 1989).  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The effect of mood on processing of a per-
suasive message was eliminated when partici-
pants were aware of the real cause for their 
momentary mood (Sinclair, Mark, and Clore, 
1994). 
INFLUENCE OF EMOTIONS ON 
ANALOGY-MAKING 
 
Though, the influence of analogy on emo-
tions was thoroughly described by Paul Tha-
gard (2001), the opposite issue concerning the 
way emotions influence analogy-making was 
scarcely investigated.  
Tohill and Holyoak (2000) demonstrated 
that situationally induces anxiety reduced rela-
tional based mapping and increased attribute 
based mapping in the case of cross-mapping 
task. These findings were explained in congru-
ence with the Eysenk’s working memory re-
striction theory (Eysenk and Calvo, 1992) sug-
gesting that anxiety restrict working memory 
capacity. Reduced working memory capacity, 
in turn impeded higher-order relational map-
ping needed for solving of cross-mapping tasks 
used in this particular study.  
Later, Vankov, Kiryazov and Grinberg 
(2008) explored the influence of fear on anal-
ogy making in the AMBR model (Kokinov 
and Petrov, 2001). The authors took the per-
spective of Revelle and Loftus (1992) who 
suggested that the effect of arousal on memory 
can be explained in terms of “tick rate hy-
pothesis”, i.e. arousal may increase the rate at 
which the environment is sampled. This “tick 
rate hypothesis” was modeled by making the 
rating mechanism dependent on the level of 
the activation of the concept fear. The rating 
mechanism in AMBR locally determines the 
winner correspondence at the constraint satis-
faction network. Increasing rating frequency 
may cause the model to disregard the structural 
correspondences at expense of superficial 
ones. Thus in the case of cross-mapping task 
the model predicts a sudden jump from making 
structurally consistent mapping to the superfi-
cial one depending on the level of the activa-
tion of the fear concept.  
These findings, however, concern the influ-
ence of specific emotion (i.e. anxiety or fear) 
on analogical mapping. In contrast, the present 
research is interested in the way mood rather 
than specific emotion may change analogy-
making processes. Penka Hristova 
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EXPERIMENT : HOW EMOTIONAL 
STATES INFLUENCE PERFORMANCE 
ON MATCHING-TO-SAMPLE TASK 
 
Imagination technique for induction of posi-
tive and negative emotions was used. Partici-
pants were asked to recall a particular past 
episode from their life that was connected with 
a strong positive or strong negative emotion 
and to describe it briefly on a sheet of paper. 
Then during an unrelated matching to sample 
task, participants were asked to judge whether 
a sample stimulus is similar to relationally 
similar but superficially dissimilar stimulus or 
to a relationally dissimilar but superficially 
similar stimulus.  
 
METHOD 
 
Design 
One factorial design was used for this ex-
periment. The independent variable was the 
type of emotional state: positive or negative 
emotional state. The dependent variable was 
the number of the similarity judgments based 
on the relational similarity between the sample 
and target stimulus.  
 
Materials 
Six target stimuli were designed based on 
the stimuli of Medin, D., Goldstone, R. and 
Gentner, D (1990) and Sloutsky and Yarlas 
(submited). Each stimulus contained 3 groups 
of geometric forms: B (i.e., the standard that 
was always presented at the center of the 
screen), T1 and T2, presented respectively at 
the lower left and lower right part of the 
screen. Both T1 and T2 were similar to B, but 
for different reasons. One of them shared simi-
lar attributes (i.e. included identical in form 
and shading figure/figures but the relations 
between figures in this superficially similar 
option were not kept analogical to the relations 
between figures in the standard) and the other 
– similar relations (i.e. at least one of the fig-
ures in this option was different in form/in 
form and shading but the three figures kept the 
same relations as the standard group). All tar-
get stimuli used in this experiment are pre-
sented in Appendix A. The position of the su-
perficially and of the structurally similar to the 
standard “B” options was varied across par-
ticipants and items.  
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were asked to participate in 2 
unrelated short experiments. The first one was 
said to aim collecting of typical situations that 
evoke positive and negative emotions in real 
life situations. On that account participants 
were instructed to try to remember a particular 
situation from their own life that gave rise to a 
strong positive or negative emotion, to imagine 
the recalled situation and to describe it with a 
few sentences. After fulfilling this task, which 
usually took from 5 to 10 minutes, participants 
were enrolled in the matching-to-sample ex-
periment for the next 5 minutes. Their task in 
this second experiment was to judge whether 
“T1” or “T2” are similar to the standard “B” 
by pushing the respective button on a BBOX: 
the left button “T1” and the right button for 
“T2”. When participants gave their answer the 
next stimulus appeared on the screen. The 
presentation order of the six target stimuli was 
randomized across participants. The timing of 
event for the matching-to-sample task is pre-
sented on Figure 1. 
Then participants were fully debriefed and 
set free. 
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Figure1. Timing of events for one trial in experi-
ment 1. 
 
Participants 
42 students from New Bulgarian University 
(21 women and 21 men) took part as volun-
teers in the experiment. Half of them partici-
pated in the positive emotion group, the other 
half in the negative emotion group. The mean 
age of the participants was 22.92 ranging form 
18 to 34 years.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The mean number of relational similarities 
chosen for each target stimulus was calculated 
(Table 1). The difference between mean rela-
tionally based similarity judgments obtained in 
the group under positive (0.246) and under 
negative mood (0.357), appeared to be signifi-
cant tested with the Repeated Measures 
ANOVA: F (1,5) = 22.273, p<0.05, ES= 
0.817.  
Participants in both mood conditions made 
more matching judgments based on attributes, 
i.e. relational based judgments were less than 
0.5 for both experimental conditions. Partici-
pants in negative mood, however, made more 
similarity judgments based on relations than 
participants in positive mood (Figure 2). 
Hence, negative mood facilitates relational 
based mapping, while positive mood – attrib-
ute based one. 
 
 
Stimulus 
N 
positive mood  negative 
mood 
1 .29  .33 
2 .24  .29 
3 .10  .24 
4 .14  .33 
5 .33  .48 
6 .38  .48 
 
Table1. Mean number of relational similarities 
for each stimulus per experimental condition 
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0.15
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Figure 2. Mean number of relationally based 
similarity judgments for positive and negative con-
dition 
Moreover, the effect of mood was obtained 
in the absence of significant difference for 
response times: F (1, 5) = 0.021, p>0.05. The 
mean response time for the similarity judgment 
under negative mood was 4636.2ms and under 
positive mood was 4591.9ms. Thus both group 
used comparable amount of time for solving 
matching-to-sample tasks. It seems, however, 
that participants in positive mood invested 
their time in making attribute correspondences, 
while participants in negative mood – in mak-
ing relational correspondences.  
+ 
time
matching-
to-sample 
task 
Fixation cross for 
50ms 
T1 T2
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CONCLUSION 
 
The experiment presented in the paper 
focuses on the influence of mood on matching-
to-sample task. It appeared that participants in 
positive mood based their similarity judgments 
on attributes, while participants in negative 
mood – on relations. It is not clear, however, 
whether mood influenced encoding of relations 
or rather the degree to which people rely upon 
relations. Nevertheless, this research opens an 
interesting question concerning the possible 
influence of the internal emotional long-lasting 
states on analogical mapping. 
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APPENDIX:  
Stimuli used in Experiment 1. The relationally simi-
lar to the standard “B” options are, respectively: 
T1, T2, T1, T2, T2, and T1. 
 
T1 T2
B
 
B
T1 T2
 
T1 T2
B
 
T1 T2
B
 
T1 T2
B
 
 
T1 T2
B
 